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University of Zurich
Résumé : 
Les sciences religieuses font face à des défis continus concernant la nature comparative du terme « reli-
gion ». Jusqu’ici, aucune définition satisfaisante n’a été proposée. De plus, depuis un demi-siècle, on ne 
cesse de soutenir que le terme est intrinsèquement chrétien (protestant) et moderne. Des études récentes 
affirment en outre que le terme « religion » en tant que catégorie devrait être abandonné. Cet article analyse 
les modalités permettant de transformer la « religion » en une catégorie et quel rôle la catégorisation a joué 
dans la recherche et l’épistémologie modernes. L’article montre que l’incapacité de l’histoire des religions à 
fixer son objet résulte de l’absence d’alternative à la logique classique. Bien qu’il existe de plus en plus de 
preuves que la logique classique ait atteint ses limites en tant qu’outil épistémologique, les logiques postmo-
dernes n’en diffèrent pas substantiellement. Cet article est un appel à la contribution active des spécialistes 
de la science de religion dans la quête pan-académique d’une véritable alternative à la logique classique. 
Dans les disciplines traitant de la religion une nouvelle logique devrait mener à un concept de « transcen-
dance sans contraire » (Latour). Pour y parvenir une première étape pourrait consister à abandonner l’idée 
de la religion en tant que catégorie pour travailler avec des concepts inscrits dans le temps et dans l’espace.
Abstract : 
The Study of Religion faces continuous challenges regarding the comparative nature of the term « religion ». 
So far, no definition has been offered that could account for its deficiencies. Moreover, for half a century now 
it was continuously argued that the term is inherently Christian (Protestant) and modern. Recent studies fur-
ther claim that the use of « religion » as an analytical category should be abandoned. The present article asks 
how, in fact, « religion » could become a category and what role categorization came to play in the modern 
academy and in modern epistemology. It is demonstrated that the constant running in circles in the Study of 
Religion with regard to its own subject results from the lack of a true alternative to classical logic. Even though 
there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that classical logic has reached its limits as an epistemological 
auxiliary, postmodern logics do not differ substantially. This paper is a call for an active contribution of scholars 
of religion in the pan-academic quest for a true alternative to classical logic. In the Study of Religion a new 
logic should enable the concept of « transcendence without contrary » (Latour). To achieve this, a first step 
might be to drop the idea that religion is a category and, instead, work with time- and space-bound concepts.
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How Could Religion 
Become A Category ? 
Accounting for Classical 
and Fuzzy Logic in 
the Conceptualization 
of Religion
Monika Amsler 
University of Zurich
Of Protestant and Modern Dichotomies
and Categories
The term religion seems to remain bulky, even though the major pitfalls have been under 
discussion for more than 50 years now1. It still causes more problems than it helps solve2. Not 
wide enough to include everything it should to be of comparative utility, the term is at the same 
time too broad to be defined. It seems to smack of Protestant Christianity and yet, the general 
notion of religion still differs considerably from Protestant Christianity3. A number of definitions 
have been proposed and rejected and we seem to walk in circles, asking ourselves repeatedly 
« Haven’t We Been There Before ? »4, without finding an escape. 
A recent attempt at « Reconstructing Religion from the Bottom Up » was taken by Wouter 
J. Hanegraaff. In this article, Hanegraaff shows that the inherent Protestantism of religion is 
founded in its dichotomy to magic. This dichotomy is the reason why religion can never become 
the comparative term it was intended to be5. Hanegraaff points out that in comparative studies, 
1 Cf. for example the substantial critique of the article by rosalie Wax, murray Wax, « The Notion of Magic », Current 
Anthropology 4/5 (1963), pp. 495-518.
2 Cf. for example most recently Brent nongBri, Before Religion : A History of a Modern Concept, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2013 ; russell t. mCCutCheon, « The Category “Religion” in Recent Publications : Twenty Years After », 
Numen 62.1 (2015), pp. 119-141 ; Carlin a. Barton, daniel Boyarin, Imagine No Religion. How Modern Abstractions 
Hide Ancient Realities, New York, Fordham University Press, 2016 ; daniel duBuisson, Religion and Magic in the 
Western Culture, Leiden – Boston, Brill, 2016 ; Wouter J. hanegraaFF, « Magic », in glenn a. magee ed., The Cambridge 
Handbook of Western Mysticism and Esotericism, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 393-404.
3 Cf. for the former argument for example Wouter J. hanegraaFF, « Reconstructing “Religion” from the Bottom Up », 
Numen 63.5-6 (2016), pp.  577-606 ; for the latter, Benson saler’s discussion of daniel duBuisson, The Western 
Construction of Religion : Myths, Knowledge and Ideology, Baltimore – London, John Hopkins University Press, 
2003 (L’Occident et la religion : mythes, science et idéologie, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1998), in Benson saler, « Concept 
of Religion », in roBert a. segal, koCku von stuCkrad eds., Vocabulary for the Study of Religion, Leiden, Brill, 2014 
(accessed online 02-01-2018).
4 See, for example, the article with this very title by aaron hughes, « Haven’t We Been Here Before ? Rehabilitating 
“Religion” in Light of Dubuisson’s Critique », in steven engler, dean miller eds., Review Symposium : Daniel 
Dubuissson, The Western Construction of Religion, Religion 36.3 (2006), pp. 127-131.
5 Cf. hanegraaFF, « Reconstructing Religion », art. cit., pp. 588-589, sketching a « crisis of comparison ».
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religion is used as a tertium comparationis, i.e. the assumption by which something is compared 
to something else. By defining religion by way of contrasting it with magic, this dichotomy 
becomes part of the tertium comparationis as well. Inevitably, the comparanda will be compared 
with regard to such a dichotomy6. As a result of such comparisons, only concepts that posit 
a similar dichotomy will be considered as « religion ». Thus, religion should not be defined 
against a dichotomous « other », by which Hanegraaff exclusively refers to magic. Based on this, 
he proposes a working definition, which should help free the tertium from such an inherent 
Protestantism as the distinction between religion and magic. According to this definition 
(inspired by Clifford Geertz), religion is a « symbolic system that influences human action by 
providing possibilities for ritually maintaining contact between the everyday world and a more 
general meta-empirical framework of meaning »7 (my emphasis).
The emphasis shows that this definition cannot do without a dichotomous « other » either. 
It implements a dichotomy between everyday and meta-empirical frameworks. This dichotomy 
is indeed not a Protestant one but a rephrasing of dichotomies central to the modern paradigm, 
namely nature, society, and the transcendent8. Thus, while a tertium comparationis that maintains 
the dichotomy between religion and magic may rightly be judged as influenced by Protestant 
theology, the definition proposed by Hanegraaff as an alternative tertium is distinctly modern. It is 
modern, because it is based on a paradigm of separate spheres, in this case an everyday world, 
a « between » and a meta-empirical framework (i.e. transcendence). If this definition of religion is 
used as a tertium and applied on a culture that does not share the paradigm of separate spheres, 
then there is no religion. This tertium defines a religion not based on a Protestant Christian 
prototype, but on a modern one9. 
Modern Reason
After the uncovering of crypto-Protestantism in the Study of Religion and magic, as done by 
Hanegraaff and others in recent years, it might be time to address « crypto-modern reasoning » 
as well. However, in its basic assumptions the latter is not as distinct from the former as 
commonly assumed.
The use of the term « modern » requires qualification, since it has been used in different 
contexts and with various nuances. Thus, when Bruno Latour’s book We Have Never Been 
Modern was published in its English translation in 1993, the publisher adorned the front page 
with the picture of a Viking helmet, which to him apparently symbolized a non-modern condition. 
6 On comparison as an analytical tool, cf. ralPh WeBer, « On Comparing Ancient Chinese and Greek Ethics : The tertium 
comparationis as a Tool of Analysis and Evaluation », in riChard a. h. king ed., The Good Life and Conceptions of Life in 
Early China and Graeco-Roman Antiquity, Berlin – Boston, De Gruyter, 2015, pp. 29-56. hanegraaFF, « Reconstructing 
Religion », art. cit., pp. 598-599, is referring to a previous and less elaborate contribution by ralPh WeBer on this 
subject, « Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium : Comparing What with What, and in What Respect ? », Dao 13 
(2014), pp. 151-171.
7 hanegraaFF, « Reconstructing Religion », art. cit., p. 601.
8 Cf. Bruno latour, We Have Never Been Modern, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993 (Nous n’avons 
jamais été modernes : essai d’anthropologie symétrique, Paris, La Découverte, 1991), pp. 29-35.
9 In the following the term modern is used not in a qualifying manner but as reference to an epoch. The unspecific 
nature of such epochs should not be of concern. Indeed, it seems that in the endeavor for precision in the so-called 
inexact sciences, the paradox of precision and certainty has been neglected. The paradox states : The more precise 
the less certain and vice-versa ; cf. Constantin v. negoita, « The Poetic License of the Fuzzy Paradigm », in vladimir 
dimitrov, viCtor korotkiCh eds., Fuzzy Logic, Berlin – Heidelberg, Springer, 2002, pp. 94-98, here pp. 94-95.
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This provocation is enhanced by the fact that the English translation does not render the subtitle 
of the French original: Essays of a symmetrical Anthropology. Judging from this cover, one 
might think that the book was either written to describe non-modern conditions or to accuse 
modern men of not being modern enough. Yet, the exact opposite is true. Latour shows that 
the implementation of modern ideas is not possible in reality and that it would be better to 
stop forcing it. Modernity, in Latour’s sense, is a way of generating knowledge by means of 
classification of previously isolated structures, phenomena, signs, and things, which lead to a 
proliferation of non-classifiable hybrids. Classifications, on the other hand, lead to dichotomies10. 
The most fundamental modern dichotomy is the one between the human and the non-human. 
It is followed by other, more and more detailed dichotomies, the next general ones being the 
dichotomies between nature, society, and the transcendent. Many of the less fundamental 
dichotomies have been negotiated in recent postmodern discussions, for example the cultural 
dichotomy between « us and them », i.e. the modern and the non-modern world. In general, the 
disciplines of the modern academy reflect the principal divisions still quite well. 
Three laws (initially by Aristotle) have come to govern modern classification and make-up the 
framework, the « laws of thought », of modern reason or « classical logic » :
- The law of bivalence : « A proposition is either true or false » ;11
- The law of non-contradiction : « A is not non-A » ;12
- The law of the excluded middle : « There is no third that is at the same time A 
and non-A »13.
All of these three laws are about making distinctions and about clarifying the dichotomy between 
A and non-A. Aristotle himself may have had rather tangible cases of application in mind, the 
modern interpretation of his laws, however, applies them to much more abstract things and signs 
as well – basically to everything14. So much so that modern men gradually came to « require a 
dualist attitude »15 in order to be at peace with themselves.
Why, then, should « crypto-modern reasoning » be a problem if this is how classical 
academic logic works ? To follow Hanegraaff’s argument again : because it generates a biased 
tertium comparationis. The modern paradigm rests on distinct premises and is therefore not 
necessarily compatible with other paradigms. Modern concepts, that is, concepts generated 
on the basis of modern logic, will only consider comparanda based on a different logic as non-
scientific, unreasonable or, according to the law of bivalence, as simply « false ». They may also, 
and this is what I suspect Hanegraaff’s definition does, subtly transfer modern reason onto a 
different logical framework, thereby positing modern logic as a universal.
10 On dichotomies cf. latour, op. cit., pp. 11, 97-100.
11 Cf. Jean-yves BéZiau, « Bivalence, Excluded Middle and Non Contradiction », in liBor Behounek ed., The Logica Yearbook 
2003, Prague, Academy of Sciences, 2003, pp. 73-84, here p. 74.
12 JosePh e. Brenner, Logic in Reality, Heidelberg, Springer 2008, here p. 2.
13 Ibid.
14 For the position of Aristotelian logic in Western intellectual history, cf.  [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-
logic/] (accessed 11-9-2017). Kant, for example, « thought that Aristotle had discovered everything there was to know 
about logic, and the historian of logic Prantl drew the corollary that any logician after Aristotle who said anything new 
was confused, stupid, or perverse » (ibid ).
15 latour, op. cit., p. 102.
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Moreover, « crypto-modern reasoning » keeps the Study of Religion (and no doubt other 
disciplines as well) trapped in the conflict between modern academic reason and postmodern 
critique of this very reason. This is a vicious circle, since postmodern argumentation follows 
these three laws as well. Even non-classical postmodern logics never criticize and revise more 
than one of the three laws and can therefore be translated back into classical logic16. Thus, 
in its failure to propose a real alternative to classical logic, postmodern deconstruction rather 
reinforces than criticizes modern assumptions. 
In the Study of Religion, modern arguments and postmodern counterarguments have led to 
the two-sided agreement that religion is, in fact, a category. 
The Naturalization of Religion
as a Category : Part I
Religion has already been conceptualized in many ways : as something bigger and more universal 
than its offshoots, the so-called world-religions ; as « natural religion » or phenomenon or 
otherwise essential ; as an evolutionary step in our episteme ; as a system of symbols or beliefs 
and, most recently, as a category. While the first notions on this list have received considerable 
attention both in their development and deconstruction, the category has been adopted without 
much ado. Apart from Robert Baird’s Category Formation and the History of Religions (1971) 
there seems to have been no substantial discussion of the matter17. 
For Baird, however, the transition from phenomenon to category was a major shift in the 
(historical) Study of Religion, because it signified the transition from the « essential-intuitional 
method »18 to a focus on definition19. What was adopted in the discipline, however, was not 
Baird’s own (functional) definition but the different types of definitions he described. 
However, the various definitions that have been proposed for religion were based on 
individually chosen prototypes according to expertise. Therefore, no definition was comparative 
enough to serve for research undertaken with another focus (see also discussion below). The 
quest for a consensual definition for religion, a basic requirement for a category, was thereupon 
steadily abandoned20. 
Via a cluster of modifying adjectives, however, the « category religion » could be retained 
despite the lack of a definition. The most frequent of these qualifiers is « heuristic ». The idea 
of a « heuristic category » might be a remote spin-off from Algebra, where categories were 
16 Cf. dov m. gaBBay, « Classical vs. Non-Classical Logic (The Universality of Classical Logic) », in dov m. gaBBay, Chris J. 
hogger, John a. roBinson eds., Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Vol. 2 : Deduction 
Methodologies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 359-457.
17 roBert d. Baird, Category Formation and the History of Religions, The Hague, Mouton, 1971.
18 Ibid, pp. 2-5.
19 Definitions were generally thought to supply a « criterion for the exclusion of what was literally nonsense » ; isaiah 
Berlin, « Logical Translation », in henry hardy ed., Concepts and Categories : Philosophical Essays, vol. 2, London, 
Pimlico, 1978, pp. 56-80, here p. 73. This « nonsense » was feared as a relapse into metaphysics.
20 The proposed definitions involve real, lexical, nominal and stipulative (or functional) as well as working definitions. 
For a detailed explanation of these types of definitions, cf. Baird, op. cit., pp. 4-16 ; more concisely, see hanegraaFF, 
« Reconstructing », op. cit., p. 584. On definitions for religion in general see miChael stausBerg, mark q. gardiner, 
« Definition », in miChael stausBerg, steven engler éds., The Oxford Handbook of the Study of Religion, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2016, pp. 9-32.
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introduced for heuristic purposes21. However, without any explanation of the heuristics that the 
scholar intends to apply, the label « only disguises the fact that scholars wish to avoid defining 
the (supposedly) undefinable and instead resort to pre-theoretical or even everyday language, 
thereby leaving the task of sense-making to their readers »22. 
Before discussing other types of categories proliferating in the field, it may be worth looking 
at the very nature of categories first. This will help to answer the question of how religion could 
become an undefined category.
Philosophy and Implication of Categories
Category formation has reached the Study of Religion via several disciplines. Baird pointed to 
« anthropologists, sociologists, physical scientists, and logicians »23. For the present purposes, 
the above-mentioned spin-off from a so-called exact science, mathematics, shall be discussed. 
This will not only provide some basic information concerning the nature of categories but 
dismantle prejudices concerning the exactness of category theory. Recently, there has been 
increasing awareness that the evaluation of data is by no means less decision-choice based in 
higher mathematics than in the Humanities24. 
Category theory was introduced into Algebra in 1942 by Professors Samuel Eilenberg 
and Saunders Mac Lane, though only in the margins and as an auxiliary device. They used 
categories as axiomatic definitions for heuristic purposes. The intellectual context of the theory 
was structuralism, in which mathematics and humanities interacted « closely and fruitfully »25. A 
result of these interactions was structural mathematics. Category theory combined structuralism 
with the « axiomatic method » as introduced by David Hilbert and adopted by Albert Einstein. 
This method demands « the sharp separation of the logical form’ and the realistic and intuitive 
contents »26. This separation is achieved via the postulation of axioms. However, the ridge 
between the conscious use of a self-posited axiom as an auxiliary in research and the notion that 
an axiom is a self-evident universal truth is narrow. Indeed, « (a) drawback of Hilbert’s axiomatic 
revolution [...] is the revival of the traditional metaphysical thinking (that Kant calls dogmatic) 
in the new cloths of formal logical methods. Tarski’s world of individuals and classes would be 
still there even if the empirical science would not exist and would not be possible »27. Thus, the 
very idea of the axiomatic method is deeply connected to the search for a dogmatic truth, quite 
similar to the purpose of dogmatic theology. 
21 Jean-Pierre marquis, « What is Category Theory ? », in giandomeniCo siCa ed., What is Category Theory ?, Monza, 
Polimetrica S.a.s., 2006, pp. 221-256, here p. 222.
22 Bernd-Christian otto, « Magic and Religious Individualization. On the Construction and Deconstruction of Analytical 
Categories in the Study of Religion », Historia Religionum 9 (2017), pp. 29-52, here p. 38.
23 Baird, op. cit., p. 1.
24 Cf. koFi k. domPere, Fuzziness and Foundations of Exact and Inexact Sciences (Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing 
290), Berlin – Heidelberg, Springer, 2013, pp. 1-14.
25 andrei rodin, Axiomatic Method and Category Theory, Cham, Springer, 2014, p.  236 and ibid. for the afterlife of 
structuralism in North-American mathematics.
26 Albert Einstein, quoted in ibid., p. 245.
27 Ibid., p. 245. Mathematician Alfred Tarski (1901-1983) « is widely considered as one of the greatest logicians of the 
twentieth century (often regarded as second only to Gödel), and thus as one of the greatest logicians of all time » ; cf. 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. « Alfred Tarski » [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski] (accessed 01-22-18).
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Members of a category are equal and share one or more features. Since categories are axioms 
they allow « to see the universal components of a family of structures of a given kind »28. Thus, 
category theory is a « dream come true » for structuralists in that structures that share a certain 
characteristic can be gathered and posited as self-evident universals29.
Further, categories are dichotomous in that their components cannot be members of 
categories A and non-A at the same time (cf. above, the law of the excluded middle). Categories 
and their relationship towards each other can be depicted as follows :
While this picture seems indeed very primitive and simplified, it is basically, what category-
theory is all about : It is a way of simplifying complex structures. Or, as a layperson put it : « [b]y 
throwing away all the details, an object’s structure reveals itself »30. In that regard, categories are 
« general abstract nonsense »31.
Category theory has quickly gained prominence and even, at least in the assessment of its 
proponents, threatens to replace the older set theory as a foundational theory in mathematics32. 
Sets are defined as opposites but, contrary to categories, they are not mutually exclusive. Thus, 
some elements can be contained in two (or more) sets, thereby generating an overlap of the 
sets. This overlap can be defined as union A ∪ B33. In order to eliminate this overlap, one can 
posit the intersection A ∩ B as a « cut set », that is, it can be « cut out ». 
Thus, with the uncut overlap, set theory is accounting for the « middle » between two or 
more sets, while category theory is not. Accordingly, category theory is much more restricted by 
the classical laws of thought than set theory : the law of bivalence is expressed in the axiomatic 
nature of the categories (i.e. they are either true axioms or false categories) ; the law of non-
contradiction is expressed in the dichotomous nature of categories (i.e. category A and its 
members are distinct from category non-A) ; and the middle is considered as simply not existing 
28 Jean-Pierre marquis, « Category Theory », Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
category-theory/] (accessed 06-27-2017).
29 rodin, op. cit., p. 252.
30 roBert seaton in his blog : [http://rs.io/why-category-theory-matters/] (accessed 10-18-2017).
31 marquis, « Category Theory », art. cit., pp. 221 and 223, based on a quote by Norman Steenrod. 
32 At least in the assessment of a proponent of category theory, cf. marquis, « Category Theory », art. cit.. However, this 
seems very controversial.
33 As used in the example given by domPere, op. cit., p. 84 and (too) easily transferable to the theological realm as well. 
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(law of excluded middle). It follows that the great attraction of category formation is that it allows 
to act according to what is reasonable, « logic », to us. Category formation is classical logic 
turned into a method.
The « exclusion of the middle » and its somewhat merciless application has generally been 
an issue in postmodern criticism. Thus, one counterproposal was « fuzzy logic ». Fuzzy logic tries 
to overcome the rigidity of classical logic and its limitations by inclusion of the middle. It was 
proposed in 1908 and has gained new attention in more recent scholarship34. 
The difference between set theory and fuzzy set theory, however, does not affect the algebraic 
formulae, since A ∩ B still describes the intersection between sets A and B35. Rather, the changes 
affect its semantics and philosophical conceptualization. Thus, in fuzzy logic, the dualism of the 
sets is conceived of as a « duality »36. The two sets are connected rather than divided and form a 
continuum instead of an intersection. Fuzzy logic is thereby decidedly post-modern : It criticizes 
modern logic and points to its deficiencies, while, at the same time, depending on it. Without 
defined sets, there is no continuum and a continuum generated by defined sets will always allow 
for deduction, as is expressed in the still valid algebraic formulae. 
In the Study of Religion, the notion of a continuum was introduced as early as 1909 to illustrate 
the relationship between magic and religion, which were, however, seen as phenomena and not 
as sets37. The idea was that magico-religious hybrids could be properly classified by means of a 
continuum between the sets religion and magic. Yet, in practice, the continuum merely served 
as a scale : A hybrid was placed on the continuum according to arbitrarily defined criteria and then 
subsumed under the set to which it seemed more closely related. In the end, the continuum 
only served to define the extent of a set and to classify the content of the intersection properly 
in order to get rid of this hybrid middle. In short, the notion of the continuum in the Study of 
Religion only helped to turn sets into categories. 
The Naturalization of Religion
as a Category : Part II
Coming back to the initial question of how religion could become a category without substantial 
discussion of the matter, a first conclusion may be drawn. It seems now evident that the transition 
from the notion of religion as an essential and omnipresent phenomenon to an axiomatic and 
universal category was not a big one. Indeed, the premises remained the same : Religion remains 
a distinct, universal, and eternal item, standing in a dichotomy to other categories such as magic 
and science. Similar to the differences between set theory and fuzzy set theory, the difference 
between the phenomenon religion and the category religion merely affects the semantic level, 
but not the logical one. If there was a change, it was that the dependency on classical logic and, 
with that, on the modern paradigm, was increased. Thus, the shift to a category is diametrically 
opposed to postmodern attempts to macerate modern dichotomies.
34 Cf. negoita, art. cit., p. 96 ; domPere, op. cit..
35 Cf. domPere, op. cit., p. 85.
36 Ibid.
37 In roBert r. marett, The Threshold of Religion, London, Methuen, 1909 ; for a discussion, cf. Bernd-Christian otto, 
Magie. Rezeptions- und Diskursgeschichtliche Analysen von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit, Berlin – New York, De Gruyter, 
2011, pp. 83-87.
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Category formation isolates features and regroups them into categories. This separation and 
isolation of phenomena, structures, signs, and things is inherently characteristic of modern 
science. The procedure becomes tangible in the form of the modern laboratory, which is all about 
isolation of mechanisms. The separation of networks into their assumed components, however, 
does not result in an accurate picture of what is really happening. Rather, the results will always 
have to be translated into a multifarious system again38. To explain light, for example, « [b]oth 
electromagnetic and quantum theory are needed »39. The laboratory illustrates very well, how 
the modern mind functions based on isolation and categorization. Thus, the modern paradigm 
divides « the whole » up into isolated spheres, the most basic of which are nature, society and 
the transcendent. Religion, then, comprises a set of further isolated parts of these three spheres 
and stands against an equal sphere of non-religion.
Due to the law of non-contradiction, religion does not have to be defined, but can also be passively 
deduced from what is perceived as non-religion. This is why religion needs not be defined and 
still has the meaning of a more or less equally shaped distinct realm in every modern mind.
Again, this is « laboratory work » : while religion may be isolated in this way in the laboratory, 
the world outside the laboratory confronts the model with other conditions. Whenever scholars 
try to apply it to data that does not strictly obey to the three laws of thought, they are forced 
to explain the deficiency of either the data or the model. Out of necessity, the model has then 
to be combined with other categories. Bruno Latour refers to this procedure as the creation of 
a hybrid.40 The following random example illustrates the insufficiency of such an isolated and 
encapsulated sphere of religion :
Pervasive and invasive, religious mentality shaped the lens through which the people of 
the Roman world viewed their surroundings and everyday routines. Religious vocabulary 
and imagery seeped into every strata of language and helped people mediate, explain, and 
interpret their interactions with their environment. Names and characteristics of gods, the 
messages of myths and legends, and the force of folk beliefs underlay ancient understanding 
of both natural phenomena and human situations just as scientific « truth » outlines the 
contours of our world today. Religion, or to be more precise, what we today call religion, 
encompassed all.41
38 Cf. also Bruno latour’s description of what he calls the « work of translation » (op. cit., pp. 10-13).
39 negoita, art. cit., p. 97. 
40 Cf. latour, op. cit., pp. 1-12.
41 yaron Z. eliav, « A Scary Place : Jewish Magic in the Roman Bathhouse », in leah di segni, yiZhar hirsChFeld, JosePh 
PatriCh, rina talgam eds., Man Near a Roman Arch. Studies Presented to Prof. Y. Tsafrir, Jerusalem, The Israel 
Exploration Society, 2009, pp. 88-97, here p. 88.
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The model of a distinct sphere of religion can easily be mistaken with a category, since they are both 
generated on the basis of the same logical premises. The insufficiency of such a static category of 
religion is then also expressed through the many prefixed modifications that proliferate in the field 
and do not contribute to a clear taxonomy of the category. Some qualifications exhibit an unclear 
notion of a category (i.e. « taxonomic category »)42, or are pleonasms (i.e. « comparative cross-
cultural category »)43. It seems that the category is increasingly conflated with a term, since only 
terms are used « (o)ften with [a] modifying word or phrase, as abstract term, general term, term 
of abuse, term of endearment »44, but not categories or concepts. Moreover, many modifications 
exhibit a binary structure such as : « folk category » vs. « academic category »45 as equal to « first-
order » vs. « second-order category » ; « historical category » vs. « essential, ahistoric category » ; 
« insider/emic category » vs. « outsider/etic category » ; the « local category » vs. « universalized 
category »46. Such binary modifications have also been applied to discourses : « polemical and 
affirmative discourses », « discourses of exclusion and inclusion », « contemporary mainstream 
and elitist discourses »47. Indeed, especially in historical discourse analysis, the way in which a 
discourse differs from a category is often not evident, especially in cases where the « spatio-
temporal specificity » of terms is neglected48. Thus, obviously, religio and mageia cannot refer to 
religion and magic, and yet, still, the conflation is omnipresent49.
Then there are modifications that aim at un-categorizing categories by macerating 
their boarders, thereby turning them into fuzzy sets. Such is the nature of the « open-ended 
category »50, « unbounded category »51, « polythetic category »52, « ambiguous » or « multi-layered 
category »53 and the « graded category »54.
While binary categories generate even more dichotomies, fuzzy ones try to reduce the 
number and importance of dichotomies. They create a category of religion that is capable of 
including hybrids instead of creating them. Thus, instead of creating hybrids via a rigid selection 
by means of sufficient criteria for admission to the category, the criteria are held more flexible. 
Since the category of religion that was conceptualized according to classical logic has proven to 
be unpractical in many ways, it seems only conclusive to turn to fuzzy categories for a solution. 
42 russell t. mCCutCheon, Manufacturing Religion. The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia, 
New York – Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, esp. 127-157, here pp. 152 and 156.
43 mCCutCheon, op. cit., p. 149.
44 Cf. [http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/199409?rskey=gWgTLN&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid] (accessed 11-08-2017).
45 Variably also called analytical, scholarly or intellectual category.
46 All the examples are taken from mCCutCheon, op. cit., pp. 127-157.
47 otto, art. cit., pp. 29, 46, 47.
48 Cf. tim murPhy, « Wesen und Erscheinung in the History of the Study of Religion : A Post-Structuralist Perspective », 
Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 6.2 (1994), pp. 119-146, here p. 120, citing Hubert Seiwert referring to the 
misguided assumption that Buddhism in China in the eighth century and Buddhism in Ceylon in the twentieth century 
refer to the same thing, or, as might be reformulated for the present purpose, to the same discourse.
49 Cf. for example, kimBerly B. stratton, « Magic Discourse in the Ancient World », in Bernd-Christian otto, miChael 
stausBerg eds., Defining Magic. A Reader, Sheffield, Routledge, 2013, pp. 243-254.
50 Cf. mCCutCheon, op. cit., p. 131.
51 Cf. Benson saler, Conceptualizing Religion : Immanent Anthropologists, Transcendent Natives and Unbounded 
Categories, New York – Oxford, Berghahn, 2000 (1993), pp. 253-264.
52 Cf. otto, art. cit., p. 39.
53 Cf. Ibid., p. 51.
54 Cf. saler, op. cit., p. xii.
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Religion : A Fuzzy Category ?
The Polythetic Classification
A polythetic classification aims at a taxonomy by means of classes « which surrendered the 
idea of perfect, unique, single differentia – a taxonomy that retained the notion of necessary 
but abandoned the notion of sufficient criteria for admission to a class »55. The background of 
polythetic classification is botany, where between fifty to one hundred characteristics are used 
to define a class (or taxon) « the possession of any one of which is sufficient for admission to 
the taxon »56. The goal of such numerical taxonomies is for the taxa (or classes) to embrace new 
species. The taxa that were once established based on a monothetic classification, however, 
remain unchanged. Thus, « [n]o useful new zoological or botanical taxonomies of any great 
size will be produced by the computers, at least until taxonomists are ready to abandon the 
classifications of the past in toto »57.
The same is true for Jonathan Z. Smith’s attempt to devise a « polythetic classification of 
early Judaism »58. He instantly turned to texts that had previously been defined as Jewish (i.e. the 
Hebrew Bible, Philo, Paul and Josephus) and so called Jewish symbols to define and verify the 
criteria59. Thus, insofar as Smith did not depart from the taxon « Judaism/Jewish » he could not 
obtain a polythetic classification that differed from a former monothetic one. Such a procedure 
is conflicting in that it aims at macerating the boarders of the category (or taxon), while at the 
same time maintaining them. 
Family Resemblance
A way to reduce the complexities of numerical classification is to exchange the therefore 
indispensable high number of characteristics with the notion of Wittgenstein’s « family 
resemblance ». Benson Saler proposed this approach to describe a category of religion. He 
suggests that a prototype should be chosen to which the other members of the family are 
assigned by resemblance. However, since Saler is not interested in creating a new category, but 
to account for an already existing one, the choice of a prototype is arbitrary on the grounds that 
one member seems to be « a more plausible representative of a certain category than another »60. 
For example, if it were assumed that the members of the family religion were religions, this 
would imply that « [s]ome religions, in a manner of speaking, are “more religious” than others »61, 
namely those who come closer to the prototype. According to Saler, the appointment of a 
prototype leads to a hierarchization within the category, turning it into a « graded category »62. 
In fact, the prototype is nothing else than the tertium comparations and responsible for the 
55 smith, art. cit., p. 4.
56 Ibid., p. 8.
57 riChard e. BlaCkWelder, « A Critique of Numerical Taxonomy », Systematic Zoology 16.1 (1967), pp. 64-72, here p. 71.
58 smith, art. cit., p. 9.
59 However, smith, art. cit., p. 138, n. 35-37, referred to all of the three collections that he used as being Jewish.
60 saler, op. cit., p. xiv. Interestingly, Saler anticipates the category already in this statement. If « family resemblance » 
is not used to define a category but to include other « signs and things » in a pre-defined category, then there is really 
no difference between a polythetic classification and a classification by means of « family resemblance ».
61 Ibid., p. xiv.
62 Ibid.
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different kinds of -centricisms of comparisons (here expressed in the hierarchy). While this 
sketch certainly accounts for the problems that are generally encountered when using religion 
as a category, it is not clear, what analytical purpose such a « graded category » could serve. After 
all, a category should serve as an auxiliary for research and not vice versa. 
Polythetic classification and graded categories were both introduced to allow for permeability 
between categories. While the theory seems to be sound, foregoing two of the three classical 
laws of thought (no excluded middle; A can be non-A at the same time), the practice failed 
because the category was not established from scratch but based on a pre-theoretical notion of 
a category. 
Homeostasis
Closely related to the polythetic mode of definition is the homeostatic property cluster. It differs 
from the former in that the content of the category is visualized as properties that are non-
accidentally related. Mark Gardiner and Michael Stausberg introduce this type of definition in the 
Oxford Handbook of the Study of Religion. They describe the content of the category as a « cluster 
of commonly mentioned features, e.g. actions, attitudes, behaviors, beliefs, communities, 
discourses […] »63. The cluster « can be hierarchically ordered, in the sense that the presence 
of some might provide greater weight than others for applying the definiendum »64. The authors 
suggest critically that the decision over the number of necessary criteria for an admission to the 
category is in any case arbitrary. They also recognize the problem of the naturalization of a given 
term : if religion is defined homeostatically, the definition will be based on the use of the word 
and common-sense assumptions. Common-sense, however, will always relegate religion into 
the isolated spot discussed above.
Placing the Excluded Middle into a New Category
Another case that might be mentioned here is the one in which a formerly excluded middle 
is turned into a category in its own right. This might look like a rehabilitation of previously 
marginalized data but is, by force of the newly generated dichotomies (i.e. excluded middles), 
just a postponement of the problem.
63 gardiner, stausBerg, art. cit., p. 21.
64 Ibid.
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Magic is such a category of hybrids. Other such categories are, for example, « heresy » or 
« therapy ». The creation of hybrid categories attacks and reconfirms modern logic at the same 
time : the exclusion of the middle is criticized, but the importance of categories is confirmed. 
Such is the perpetuum mobile of postmodern scholarship.
Even though categories of hybrids seem to bear the potential of provocative, subversive and 
paradoxical conclusions, their trivia lies in that they can only subvert long held prejudices against 
their respective content.
The Fallacies of Classical Logic
Categorization is deeply entwined with the Modern Academy : it is considered the backbone of 
academic reason and even part of human nature : 
Issues related to concepts and categorization are nearly ubiquitous in psychology because of 
people’s natural tendency to perceive a thing as something. We have a powerful impulse to 
interpret our world. This act of interpretation, an act of « seeing something as X » rather than 
simply seeing it (Wittgenstein, 1953), is fundamentally an act of categorization » (emphasis 
in original).65 
Yet, there is a significant difference between the organization of tangible and visible things 
into categories such as « colours », « furniture » or « trees » and abstract ideas as gathered in 
« religion », « the holy » or « philosophy ». It is what Isaiah Berlin called the « Ionian fallacy of 
asking what everything is made of »66. However, 
[T]he Ionian philosophers themselves may be wholly guiltless of this, since what they were 
probably asking were questions of physics, from which metaphysical ones were perhaps 
not clearly distinguished in their day. But the form which this inquiry has taken in later times, 
from Aristotle to Russell, is a search for the ultimate constituents of the world in some non-
empirical sense.67
Thus, the form which Aristotle’s reflections on metaphysics have taken in the course of the 
history of their exegesis is a category mistake : Aristotle’s logic concerns a reality, a paradigm, 
that is not divided according to modern standards. Many of his statements had a much more 
tangible basis than the ideas to which they have come to be applied. 
Appropriate fragmentation, classification, and synthesis constitute the body of scientific 
work. Simply put : every method aims at facilitating fragmentation and every theory aims at 
contributing to the reliability of the synthesis. Yet, there have been and there still are other ways 
of generating knowledge (or, in more mercantilist terms : knowledge production). They just sank 
into oblivion. Classical logic, which fragmentation and categorization are based on, has reached 
65 roBert l. goldstone, alan kersten, « Concepts and Categorization », in aliCe F. healy, roBert W. ProCtor eds., 
Handbook of Psychology. Vol. 4 : Experimental Psychology, New York, Wiley, 2003, pp. 599-622, here p. 607.
66 Berlin, art. cit., p. 76.
67 Ibid.
Monika Amsler
50
its epistemological limits in many ways. The academic repertoire needs to be enhanced with 
other « logics », which can handle the fact that a proposition might be neither true nor false and 
that A can be non-A at the same time without qualifying such data as a priori non-scientific. 
This is not to say that classical logic should be discarded but that its use should be a choice 
and not done unwittingly, by force majeure. Similarly, if the conceptualization of religion as a 
category proves useful in certain cases, then there seems to be no reason why it should not 
be used as such. The application of the method « category formation » should, however, be a 
conscious and grounded decision. 
Consolidation : The Missing Concept of 
« Transcendence Without a Contrary »
French philosopher Bruno Latour has made the point that despite the deficiencies of the Modern 
project « we do not wish to become premoderns all over again »68. This is certainly true. At the 
same time, the classical (categorizing) paradigm has done all that it could for the academy69. 
What is required to proceed further in academic epistemology is, however, not postmodern 
logics, such as fuzzy logic discussed above, since they are dependent on classical logic. Rather, 
a logic is needed that differs fundamentally from classical logic in order to provide a choice 
between different systems of argumentation. This is tricky in that it is very difficult for scholars 
trained in classical logic to find anything but this very logic reasonable at all. In order to find 
another logic or, possibly, other logics, the inconceivable needs to be conceived of or, at least, 
the very possibility of its existence needs to be accepted. 
As was discussed above, scholars of religion have come across many problems that intrigue 
other disciplines as well, among them also the so-called exact sciences. Scholars of religion 
are constantly confronted with the limits of classical logic in explaining their object of study, 
which never seems to agree with the data in its rigidity as a category or becomes seemingly 
insignificant as soon as the borders of the category are softened. The Study of Religion has, 
from its very beginnings onwards, been an exercise in the application of apparently ready-made 
categories, their highly difficult justification, complex alterations and negotiations. Thus, the 
contribution of the Study of Religion should not be underestimated in the development of new 
paradigms – not least because the subject of study is mostly paradigms that differ from the 
academic one70. Therefore, the contribution of scholars of religion to the pan-academic endeavor 
of finding different « logics » is necessary, if not crucial.
A first step in this direction is acknowledging that categorization is a method for analysis 
stricto sensu. Other than categories, concepts are flexible ; they change or disappear and do 
not naturally have exact opposites. It appears that in recent studies, religion has been called 
68 latour, op. cit., p. 140.
69 Thus, for example, domPere, op. cit., p. XXVII, writes in favor of fuzzy logic : « The fuzzy paradigm ensures the practice 
of the principle of methodological doubt, activates the intellect and liberates cognitive agents from the slavery of 
mental habits without innovation ». 
70 Cf. on this issue annette y. reed, « Categorization, Collection, and the Construction of Continuity : 1 Enoch and 3 Enoch 
in and beyond “Apocalypticism” and “Mysticism” », Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 29.3 (2017), pp. 268-
311, esp. pp. 301-302.
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alternately a concept as well as a category71. Indeed, a category of religion is a distinct concept. 
But against the dominant dogmatic-axiomatic nature of categories it has to be held that religion 
can be conceptualized in different ways as well – preferably time- and space-bound in order to 
avoid the pitfall of the eternal universal.
For the historical Study of Religion, on the other hand, as well as for the study of episteme 
building on other than the modern dichotomies, the concept of a « transcendence without 
a contrary » is needed72. However, since the concept is not natural to us, there is no more 
appropriate term for it. Exactly because of that, such a concept bears the possibility of being 
described, maybe renamed, for scholarly purposes. So far, the concept is part of Bruno Latour’s 
« symmetrical anthropology » and is characterized by a non-qualifying attitude to what is perceived 
by the scholar as truth or error ; the simultaneous study of « the production of humans and non-
humans »73 ; and the abstention from an a priori « othering ». In other words, the concept is 
independent from constraints by the three classical laws of thought (bivalence, non-contradiction 
and exclusion of the middle). Research done on such a symmetric basis will not only generate 
a more objective picture of conditions, but also yield new insights into fundamentally different 
ways of reasoning – beyond categorization.
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71 Cf. as examples Jonathan Z. smith, « Religion, Religious, Religions », in mark C. taylor ed., Critical Terms for Religious 
Studies, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998, pp.  269-284, here p.  269, where he refers to religion as a 
« second-order generic category » and ibid. p.  281, where religion becomes a « second-order generic concept » ; 
hanegraaFF, art. cit., p. 577 (« concept ») and p. 586 (« category ») ; nongBri, op. cit., generally refers to religion as a 
concept, but casually also as category, for example on pp. 65 and 159.
72 Borrowed from latour, op. cit., p. 135.
73 Ibid., p. 103.
